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Artificial Entities with Natural Rights:  
Pursuing Profits at the Expense of 
Human Capital 
Loren M. Findlay∗ 
Abstract 
 This Note explores the legal and constitutional rights 
granted to corporations and highlights how these corporate 
benefits are often at the expense of individuals. Over the past 
century, the corporation has evolved, taking on human-like 
characteristics. While many statutes and the Constitution use the 
word “person,” courts have inconsistently interpreted the 
definition of “person” in determining when it expands to 
corporations. In courts’ ad hoc analysis and interpretation, 
individuals get the metaphorical short-end of the stick.  
 The First Amendment of the Constitution was interpreted 
by the U.S. Supreme Court to afford the right of free speech to 
corporations in the context of political spending. The Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was interpreted as giving 
religious protections to for-profit, closely held corporations. 
When asked whether a closely held corporation with a single 
shareholder is protected under the Fifth Amendment’s right 
against self-incrimination, the Court answered in the negative, 
again, leaving the individual vulnerable. Lastly, this Note covers 
the Supreme Court jurisprudence prohibiting an individual 
from suing a foreign corporation acting outside of the United 
States under the Alien Tort Statute. The rights and protections 
afforded corporations have been determined without much 
consistency. The only consistency is the result—harm to 
individuals and stakeholders. 
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I. Introduction 
“A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, 
and existing only in contemplation of law. . . . [I]t possesses only 
those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon 
it . . . .”1 According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the corporation is 
legally distinct from the individual, possessing different rights 
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and powers.2 Although the Black’s Law definition says 
corporations have different rights than individuals, it does not 
describe those rights.3 To begin ascertaining corporate rights, 
the Constitution and statutes are proper starting points. 
Although the Constitution does not contain the word 
“corporation,” over time, the U.S. Supreme Court has given 
corporations several constitutional rights and protections.4 
Amidst the uncertainty over corporate rights, the Supreme 
Court has attempted to define the rights of corporations on an 
ad-hoc basis, in various landmark cases such as Citizens United 
v. FEC,5 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,6 Braswell v. United States,7 
and Jesner v. Arab Bank.89 These cases illustrate various rights 
and protections corporations have as independent legal 
entities.10 
 
 2. See Corporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (outlining 
and defining essential properties of a corporation). 
 3. See id. (stating that a corporation, “ha[s] authority under law to act 
as a single person distinct from the shareholders who own it”). 
 4. See Zoe Robinson, Constitutional Personhood, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
605, 608 (2016) (“By and large the rights contained in the Constitution are 
inclusive speaking only of ‘people’ or ‘persons’ or, more narrowly, ‘citizens.’”). 
 5. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 321 (2010) (holding § 441b 
of the United States Code facially invalid because it barred corporations and 
unions “from using their general treasury funds for express advocacy or 
electioneering communications”). 
 6. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 736 (2014) 
(holding the contraceptive mandate, as applied to closely held corporations, 
violated RFRA and is therefore unlawful). 
 7. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 110 (1988) (“[T]he 
custodian’s act of production is not deemed a personal act, but rather an act of 
the corporation. Any claim of Fifth Amendment privilege asserted by the agent 
would be tantamount to a claim of privilege by the corporation—which of 
course possesses no such privilege.”). 
 8. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1408 (2018) 
(determining that the petitioners could not bring a claim against Arab Bank, 
a foreign corporation, because the claim falls outside of the parameters of the 
Alien Tort Statute). 
 9. See Robinson, supra note 4, at 608 (“[T]he question of who or what 
holds any given constitutional right has been assessed [by the Court] on an ad 
hoc basis, right-by-right and claimant-by-claimant.”). 
 10. Supra cases cited notes 5–8 and accompanying text. 
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But how can a corporation, which has “no soul to be damned 
and no body to be kicked”11 also have some of the same 
fundamental rights as individuals? Not only do corporations 
have some of the same fundamental rights as individuals, many 
of the rights individuals have today were first fortified in 
lawsuits involving corporations.12 The Court has consistently 
held that corporations are constitutional persons with a range 
of constitutional rights.13 This Note will explore the granting 
and denial of certain constitutional and legal rights to 
corporations.14 Often, the method of assigning which legal 
rights—those rights protected by United States statutory and 
common law—are extended to whom depends on legal 
recognition by the Court.15 The differentiation between who and 
what are afforded certain legal rights and to what extent 
extends to constitutional rights.16 This Note highlights a trend 
of granting certain rights and protections to corporations while 
denying other rights to them which all have the same potential 
result—harm to the individual.17 While part of this Note focuses 
on the negative implications certain corporate rights and 
protections have on individuals, it does not purport to suggest 
all rights given to corporations are damaging, it is merely the 
scope of this Note. The variety of cases analyzed is meant to 
 
 11. Edward Thurlow, First Baron Thurlow, English jurist and Lord 
Chancellor (1731–1803). 
 12. See ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN 
BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS, at xxiii (2018) (“Corporate rights were 
won in courts of law, by judicial rulings extending fundamental protections to 
businesses, even in the absence of any national consensus in favor of corporate 
rights.”). 
 13. See Robinson supra 4, at 622 (“[T]he Court has interpreted the 
constitution such that corporations are constitutional persons for an extensive 
array of constitutional rights.”). 
 14. Infra discussions Part II–IV. 
 15. See Robinson, supra note 4, at 613 (“Legal personhood, then, 
determines who or what is entitled to legal recognition.”). 
 16. See id. (“Constitutional personhood refers to a specific form of legal 
personhood that denotes a person’s status as a constitutional rights holder, 
entitled to the protective auspices of the rights contained in the U.S. 
Constitution.”). 
 17. Infra discussion Part IV. 
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provide examples for which a new framework can be used when 
determining if a corporation ought to be afforded certain legal 
and constitutional rights. Because there is no consistent 
framework under which the Court analyzes these questions, a 
uniform framework will provide more predictability and 
consistency. 
This Note consists of six parts. This part sets forth the 
foundation and background information for the Note. Part II 
provides both historical and current analysis of the Court 
examining what First Amendment rights corporations have.18 
Specifically, Citizens United is examined as the leading case 
illustrating a corporation’s right to freedom of speech.19 Hobby 
Lobby illustrates a corporation’s right to freedom of religion 
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.20 
Part III discusses the Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination, which is not provided to corporations under 
the collective entity doctrine.21 A corporation’s lack of a 
protection against self-incrimination is thoroughly explained 
through a series of Supreme Court decisions, ultimately leading 
to Braswell v. United States, which still stands as precedent.22 
Part IV analyzes the most recent test of the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS) in Jesner v. Arab Bank, in which the Court ruled 
the ATS does not apply to foreign corporations.23 Part IV also 
gives a historical backdrop of ATS, specifically in the context of 
 
 18. Infra discussion Part II. 
 19. Infra discussion Part II. 
 20. Infra discussion Part II. 
 21. Infra discussion Part III. 
 22. Infra discussion Part III. 
 23. Infra discussion Part IV. 
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the two modern cases preceding Jesner:  Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain24 and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.2526 
Part V compares the similarities and differences of some of 
the rights given and denied to corporations (those illustrated in 
Parts II–IV). Part V then sets forth a framework, proposing that 
corporations’ legal and constitutional rights should be decided 
by considering the purpose of the right and then determining 
whether that purpose is achieved by granting the right to 
corporations. In doing so, the Court should balance the adverse 
impact certain corporate rights have on individuals.27 Part V 
applies this framework to each of the four rights discussed in 
this Note.28 
The Note concludes in Part VI by reflecting on how the 
framework proposed, if implemented by the Court, may have 
altered the outcome of the cases.29 The conclusion aims not to 
criticize the Court in its decisions, but rather to propose a 
different way of understanding how these rights may be 
analyzed.30 The intention of this Note is to give the reader 
perspective on how the personification of corporations  
sometimes comes at the expense of individuals and to provide a 
potential remedy to this problem.31 
 
 24. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004) (“In sum, 
although the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action, 
the reasonable inference from the historical materials is that the statute was 
intended to have practical effect the moment it became law.”). 
 25. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013) 
[A]ll the relevant conduct took place outside the United States. And 
even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United 
States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the 
presumption against extraterritorial application. . . . [I]t would 
reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices.  
(citations omitted). 
 26. Infra discussion Part IV. 
 27. Infra discussion Part V. 
 28. Infra discussion Part V. 
 29. Infra discussion Part VI. 
 30. Infra discussion Part VI. 
 31. Infra discussion Part VI. 
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II. A Corporation’s First Amendment Rights 
Some corporate legal scholars have found the decisions in 
both Citizens United v. FEC and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc.—both of which further personified the business 
corporation—to be a disturbing extension of individual rights to 
artificial entities.32 The First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no laws 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”33 Part II 
of this Note will consider a corporation’s First Amendment 
rights. Subpart A will address freedom of speech, specifically, 
political speech, afforded to corporations. Subpart B will discuss 
the religious freedoms given to corporations through statutes 
which have their roots in the First Amendment. 
A. Right to Free Speech 
A core, fundamental tenet in American democracy is 
freedom of speech, particularly political speech.34 It is 
established that “political speech does not lose First 
Amendment protection ‘simply because its source is a 
corporation.’”35 In Buckley v. Valeo,36 the Supreme Court 
equated political spending with political speech and therefore 
 
 32. See Robert M. Ackerman & Lance Cole, Making Corporate Law More 
Communitarian:  A Proposed Response to the Roberts Court’s Personification 
of Corporations, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 895, 898 (2016) (“In both Citizens United 
v. FEC and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court 
advanced the personification of the business corporation in a manner that 
should be disturbing to both corporate legal scholars and communitarians.”). 
 33. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 34. See Nadia Imtanes, Should Corporations Be Entitled to the Same 
First Amendment Protections as People?, 39 W. ST. U. L. REV. 203, 212 (2012) 
(“One of the bases of America’s democracy is freedom of speech, especially 
political speech.”). 
 35. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010) (citing First Nat’l 
Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978)). 
 36. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (declaring various FEC 
limitations on campaign contributions unconstitutional). 
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laws hindering political spending were tested under a high level 
of scrutiny.37 The Court determined that the Federal Election 
Campaign Act’s limit on independent expenditures was 
unconstitutional, but did not rule on whether the provision 
which limited corporate and union expenditures was also 
unconstitutional.38 The issue of whether corporations were 
entitled to First Amendment protections of the right to free 
speech through political spending was not decided by the 
Supreme Court until 1978 in First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. 
Bellotti.39 
In Bellotti, the Court was confronted with a State’s criminal 
law that prohibited banks and corporations from making 
political contributions.40 When determining if a law burdening 
political speech is constitutional, the Court will use strict 
scrutiny.41 Strict scrutiny “requires the Government to prove 
that the restriction ‘furthers a compelling interest and is 
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.’”42 When applying 
strict scrutiny, the Court found Massachusetts’s law both 
 
 37. See id. at 16 (“[T]his court has never suggested that the dependence 
of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself . . . to reduce 
the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment.”). 
 38. See id. at 143 (“We conclude, however, that the limitations on 
campaign expenditures, on independent expenditures by individuals and 
groups, and on expenditures by a candidate from his personal funds are 
constitutionally infirm.”). 
 39. See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978) 
(striking down a Massachusetts criminal statute forbidding certain 
expenditures by banks and business corporations for the purpose of 
influencing the vote on referendum proposals). 
 40. See id. at 767–68 
The statute at issue prohibits appellants, two national banking 
associations and three business corporations, from making 
contributions or expenditures “for the purpose of . . . influencing or 
affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other 
than one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets 
of the corporation.”  
(citations omitted). 
 41. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (indicating the 
laws that burden political speech whether inadvertently or by design are 
subject to strict scrutiny). 
 42. Id. (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)). 
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overinclusive and underinclusive, making it fail the “narrowly 
tailored” prong, and finding that it unconstitutionally infringed 
on a business’s right to political speech.43 
A similar issue involving corporate political spending came 
before the Court thirty-two years later in Citizens United v. 
FEC.44 In Citizens United, the complainant, Citizens United, 
was a nonprofit organization, which obtained most of its funding 
from individuals, but some from for-profit groups.45 The case 
arose when Citizens United sought to release a film called 
Hillary:  The Movie (Hillary).46 Hillary was a critical “90-minute 
documentary about then-Senator Hillary Clinton, who was a 
candidate in the Democratic Party’s 2008 Presidential primary 
elections.”47 After the movie was released, Citizens United 
sought to increase viewership by releasing the movie through 
an on-demand forum and also by advertising the movie on 
television.48 Citizens United feared such efforts would run afoul 
of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA).49 
Section 441b of the BCRA prohibited “corporations and unions 
from using general treasury funds to make direct contributions 
to candidates or independent expenditures that expressly 
advocate the election or defeat of a candidate, through any form 
of media, in connection with certain qualified federal 
 
 43. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795 (“Because that portion of § 8 challenged 
by appellants prohibits protected speech in a manner unjustified by a 
compelling state interest, it must be invalidated.”). 
 44. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 330 (“Citizens United has asserted a 
claim that the FEC has violated its First Amendment right to free speech.”). 
 45. See id. at 319 (“Most of its funds are from donations by individuals; 
but, in addition, it accepts a small portion of its funds from for-profit 
corporations.”). 
 46. See id. (“In January 2008, Citizens United released a film entitled 
Hillary:  The Movie.”). 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. at 320 (“Citizens United desired to promote the 
video-on-demand offering by running advertisements on broadcast and cable 
television.”). 
 49. See id. at 321 (“It feared, however, that both the film and the ads 
would be covered by § 441b’s ban on corporate-funded independent 
expenditures, thus subjecting the corporation to civil and criminal penalties 
under § 437g.”). 
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elections.”50 Because Citizens United desired to make Hillary 
available through video-on-demand within thirty days of the 
primary elections, it would have violated § 441b’s prohibition on 
electioneering communication.51 
The Court in Citizens United went a step further than it 
had in past cases and “consider[ed] the facial validity of 
§ 441b.”52 After rejecting Citizens United’s “as applied” 
challenge,53 the Court found § 441b facially unconstitutional 
because it stifled a corporation’s freedom of political speech.54 
The dissent criticized the majority for quickly rejecting Citizens 
United’s as an applied challenge to § 441b because it “may have 
been more suitable in light of Citizens United’s circumstances 
as an organization ‘funded overwhelmingly by individuals.’”55 
Despite the dissent’s disapproval of ruling based on the facial 
validity of the statute, the Court found § 441b unconstitutional 
because “no sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on 
the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”56 As 
it stands today, for-profit corporations may contribute unlimited 
amounts in political donations from their general treasury 
pursuant to the First Amendment.57 
 
 50. Id. at 320. 
 51. See id. at 321 (“Citizens United wanted to make Hillary available 
through video-on-demand within 30 days of the 2008 primary elections. . . . 
[But, doing so would] subject[] the corporation to civil and criminal 
penalties . . . .”). 
 52. See id. at 333 (stating this further step was necessary “[i]n the 
exercise of judicial responsibility.”). 
 53. See id. at 329 (“As the foregoing analysis confirms, the Court cannot 
resolve this case on a narrower ground without chilling political speech, speech 
that is central to the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment.”). 
 54. See id. at 385 (“Congress violates the First Amendment when it 
decrees that some speakers may not engage in political speech at election time, 
when it matters most.”). 
 55. Ackerman & Cole, supra note 32, at 920 (citing Citizens United v. 
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 404 (2010)). 
 56. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010). 
 57. See Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and 
Association Rights After Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 
1024–25 (2013) (“[T]he Supreme Court held in Citizens United v. FEC that 
corporations have a First Amendment right to make unlimited, independent 
campaign expenditures . . . .”). 
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B. Right to Religious Freedom 
For many years, it has been understood in the United 
States that corporations have the right to engage in political 
speech, but, as of much more recently, “[a]pparently, they can 
get religion too.”58 In 2014, the Supreme Court recognized 
religious protections for closely held, for-profit corporations in 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.59 In Hobby Lobby, a suit 
was brought by Hobby Lobby, Mardel, Conestoga, the Hahns 
(family owner of Conestoga), and the Greens (family owners of 
Hobby Lobby and Mardel) (collectively “complainants”) against 
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and other 
federal agencies.60 Conestoga was a for-profit corporation which 
employed 950 people, Hobby Lobby was a for-profit nationwide 
chain store that employed over 13,000 individuals, and Mardel 
was a business affiliated with Hobby Lobby and employed about 
400 people.61 
The complainants challenged a mandate promulgated 
under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
which “generally require[d] employers with 50 or more full-time 
employees to offer a group health plan or group health insurance 
coverage that provides minimum essential coverage.”62 Part of 
this essential coverage included requiring an “employer’s group 
health plan or group-health-insurance coverage to furnish 
preventative care and screenings for women without any cost 
sharing requirements.”63 The mandate, however, gave an 
 
 58. See Ackerman & Cole, supra note 32, at 925 (describing the effect of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in the Hobby Lobby decision). 
 59. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 719 (2014) 
(“For all these reasons, we hold that a federal regulation’s restriction on the 
activities of a for-profit closely held corporation must comply with RFRA.”). 
 60. See id. at 703 (outlining the relevant parties). 
 61. See Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature 
of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1728–29 
(2015) (providing background on the complainants). 
 62. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. at 696 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 63. Id. at 696–97. 
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exemption to non-profit and religious organizations.64 Included 
in women’s coverage were all FDA approved contraceptive 
methods, four of which were at issue in this case.65 The four 
contraceptives contested “may have the effect of preventing an 
already fertilized egg from developing any further by inhibiting 
its attachment to the uterus.”66 
The complainants argued that the ACA’s contraceptive 
mandate violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 
1993 (RFRA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment.67 The Hahns, family owners of Conestoga, were 
devout Christians who decided to run their businesses in 
accordance with their Christian beliefs.68 According to the 
Hahns, providing four of the contraceptive methods they 
thought were abortifacients—an abortion inducing drug—
would violate their religious beliefs.69 Similarly, the Greens 
were also sincere Christians who were committed to operating 
their two family businesses, Hobby Lobby and Mardel, in line 
with those Christian beliefs.70 The Hahns and the Greens both 
objected to the same four contraceptive methods as violating 
their religious beliefs because they believed those contraceptive 
methods were abortifacients.71 
 
 64. See id. at 692 (“HHS has already devised and implemented a system 
that seeks to respect the religious liberty of religious nonprofit corporations 
while ensuring that the employees of these entities have precisely the same 
access to all FDA-approved contraceptives . . . .”). 
 65. See id. at 703 (“[The Greens] specifically object to the same four 
contraceptive methods as the Hahns and, like the Hahns, they have no 
objection to the other 16 FDA-approved methods of birth control.”). 
 66. Id. at 697–98. 
 67. See id. at 703–04 (“The Greens, Hobby Lobby, and Mardel sued HHS 
and other federal agencies and officials to challenge the contraceptive 
mandate under RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause.”). 
 68. See id. at 700 (“Norman and Elizabeth Hahn and their three sons are 
devout members of the Mennonite Church.”). 
 69. Id. at 701. 
 70. See id. at 703 (“Each family member has signed a pledge to run the 
business in accordance with the family’s religious beliefs and to use the family 
assets to support Christian ministries.”). 
 71. See id. (“Like the Hahns, the Greens believe that life begins at 
conception and that it would violate their religion to facilitate access to 
contraceptive drugs or devices that operate after that point.”). 
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RFRA “prohibits the Government from substantially 
burdening a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden 
results from a rule of general applicability” unless the 
Government can show that the burden to the person furthers a 
compelling state interest and it is the least restrictive means to 
achieve that compelling interest.72 While RFRA applies to 
“persons,” the Court quickly shot down HHS’s argument that 
the plaintiffs, as corporations, could not even bring suit under 
RFRA.73 Instead, the Court came to the conclusion that 
“Congress provided protection for people like the Hahns and 
Greens by employing a familiar legal fiction:  It included 
corporations within RFRA’s definition of ‘persons.’”74 When 
reaching this conclusion, the Court looked at the Dictionary Act 
definition of the word “person,” which included corporations, 
and decided that if Congress did not want to include 
corporations, it would have explicitly said so.75 Furthermore, 
the Court found no good reason to distinguish between 
non-profit and for-profit corporations when granting religious 
protections.76 Despite persuasive arguments from HHS and the 
dissenting justices, the Court concluded that RFRA protects 
for-profit corporations.77 The Court reasoned that “allowing 
Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel to assert RFRA claims 
protects the religious liberty of the Greens and the Hahns.”78  
 
 72. Id. at 705 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 73. See id.  
HHS contends that neither these companies nor their owners can 
even be heard under RFRA . . . because they seek to make a profit 
for their owners, and the owners cannot be heard because the 
regulations . . . apply only to the companies and not the owners as 
individuals. HHS’s argument would have dramatic consequences. 
 74. Id. at 706. 
 75. See id. at 708 (“Thus, unless there is something about the RFRA 
context that ‘indicates otherwise,’ the Dictionary Act provides a quick, clear, 
and affirmative answer to the question whether the companies involved in 
these cases may be heard.”). 
 76. See id. (“No known understanding of the term ‘person’ includes some 
but not all corporations.”). 
 77. See id. at 709 (“Furthering their religious freedom also ‘furthers 
individual religious freedom.’”). 
 78. Id. 
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After determining that closely held, for-profit corporations 
were protected under RFRA, the Court then assessed whether 
the contraceptive mandate violated RFRA by “substantially 
burdening the exercise of religion.”79 The Court looked at the 
steep financial burden mandate noncompliance puts on the 
corporations.80 The Court illustrated the gravity of the potential 
fines:  “For Hobby Lobby, the bill could amount to $1.3 million 
per day or about $475 million per year; for Conestoga, the 
assessment could be $90,000 per day or $33 million per year; 
and for Mardel, it could be $40,000 per day or about $15 million 
per year.”81 HHS responded by arguing there was no substantial 
burden on the exercise of religion because requiring a company 
to provide health coverage that included the contraceptive 
mandate was too attenuated of a link to what the companies 
found to be morally wrong—destruction of an embryo.82 The 
Court dismissed this argument for not answering “whether the 
HHS mandate imposes a substantial burden on the ability of the 
objecting parties to conduct business in accordance with their 
religious beliefs.”83 After looking at the potential penalties the 
corporations would face, the Court found the mandate imposed 
a substantial burden on the businesses.84 
 
 79. See id. at 719 (noting that the court had little trouble in determining 
that the HHS contraceptive mandate did substantially burden the free 
exercise of religion). 
 80. See id. at 720 (“If the companies continue to offer group health plans 
that do not cover the contraceptives at issue, they will be taxed $100 per day 
for each affected individual.”). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See id. at 723 
HHS’s main argument (echoed by the principal dissent) is basically 
that the connection between what the objecting parties must do 
(provide health insurance coverage for four methods of 
contraception that may operate after the fertilization of an egg) and 
the end that they find to be morally wrong (destruction of an 
embryo) is simply too attenuated. 
 83. Id. at 724. 
 84. See id. at 726 (“Because the contraceptive mandate forces them to pay 
an enormous sum of money—as much as $475 million per year in the case of 
Hobby Lobby—if they insist on providing insurance coverage in accordance 
with their religious beliefs, the mandate clearly imposes a substantial burden 
on those beliefs.”). 
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Once the Court decided the contraceptive mandate imposed 
a substantial burden on the businesses, the mandate could only 
survive if it passed the strict scrutiny test.85 Under strict 
scrutiny, HHS first had to show the mandate was in 
“furtherance of a compelling governmental interest.”86 HHS 
provided the Court with several compelling governmental 
interests such as promoting public health, gender equality, and 
ensuring women have access to all FDA approved 
contraceptives.87 The Court agreed promoting public health, 
gender equality, and ensuring women have access to all 
FDA-approved contraceptives may be compelling state interests 
and proceeded to assess whether HHS had used the least 
restrictive means when furthering that interest—the second 
prong of strict scrutiny analysis.88 The Court concluded the 
contraceptive mandate the HHS imposed was not the least 
restrictive means for furthering the compelling government 
interest.89 There were other viable alternatives the Government 
and HHS could pursue.90 Because the Government could 
“assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives at issue to 
any women who are unable to obtain them under their 
health-insurance policies due to their employers’ religious 
 
 85. See id. (“Since the HHS contraceptive mandate imposes a substantial 
burden on the exercise of religion, we must . . . decide whether HHS has 
shown that the mandate both ‘(1) is in furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest.’”). 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. (“HHS asserts that the contraceptive mandate serves a variety 
of important interests, but many of these are couched in very broad terms, 
such as promoting ‘public health’ and ‘gender equality.’”) (citations omitted). 
 88. See id. at 728 (“We will assume that the interest in guaranteeing 
cost-free access to the four challenged contraceptive methods is compelling 
within the meaning of RFRA and we will proceed to consider the final prong 
of the RFRA test.”). 
 89. See id. (“The least-restrictive means standard is exceptionally 
demanding, and it is not satisfied here.”) (citations omitted). 
 90. See id. (“HHS has not shown that it lacks other means of achieving 
its desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of 
religion by the objecting parties in these cases.”). 
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objections,”91 the Court concluded that requiring employers to 
go against their religious beliefs, was not the least restrictive 
means.92 The contraceptive mandate could not pass strict 
scrutiny, making it unlawful.93 The Court ultimately decided 
the contraceptive mandate violated RFRA and did not analyze 
the First Amendment issue, leaving undecided whether or not a 
for-profit corporation can find religious protection under the 
Constitution.94 
III. The Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination Is 
Not Applicable to Corporations 
The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself.”95 Despite the plain language of 
the constitutional amendment, the right to invoke the Fifth 
Amendment may be available in civil, criminal, and bankruptcy 
proceedings.96 The government infringes on an individual’s 
privilege against self-incrimination when the individual can 
show that:  (1) there is testimony; (2) the testimony is compelled; 
and (3) the testimony is incriminating.97 In general, an 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. at 730 (“[T]he HHS regulations fail the least-restrictive-means 
test. HHS itself has demonstrated that it has at its disposal an approach that 
is less restrictive than requiring employers to fund contraceptive methods that 
violate their religious beliefs.”). 
 93. See id. at 736 (“The contraceptive mandate, as applied to closely held 
corporations, violates RFRA.”). 
 94. See Robinson, supra note 4, at 665 (“Although the litigation 
culminated in a Supreme Court decision that focused solely on the statutory 
claims made by the corporate litigants, the constitutional issue was argued 
before the Court, and the potential for a corporate religious liberty claim 
remains.”). 
 95. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 96. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–45 (1972) (indicating 
that compelling testimony from an unwilling witness in a civil case is 
permitted by conferring immunity so long as the compelled testimony and 
evidence derived therefrom is not used in subsequent criminal proceedings). 
 97. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976) (describing an 
infringement of the right against self-incrimination when there is compulsion, 
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individual may not invoke the right against self-incrimination 
to avoid compliance with a subpoena seeking pre-existing 
records because the creation of those records was voluntary, and 
thus not compelled.98 While the contents of documents are not 
protected under the Fifth Amendment, the act of producing 
those documents implicates the privilege against 
self-incrimination if the act of production is testimonial.99 
The Supreme Court established the collective entity 
doctrine in Hale v. Henkel100 when it determined that a 
corporation has no Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination.101 The decision in Hale imposed restrictions 
on the scope of the Fifth Amendment, but left open questions 
concerning “whether a corporate custodian could resist a 
subpoena for corporate documents by invoking his own Fifth 
Amendment privilege.”102 The subsequent cases after Hale 
further refined the nuances of the collective entity doctrine. 
In Wilson v. United States,103 the Supreme Court 
determined that a corporate custodian in possession of corporate 
 
whether that act-of-production is testimonial, and whether it is 
incrimination). 
 98. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610 (1984) (“As we noted in 
Fisher, the Fifth Amendment protects the person asserting the privilege only 
from compelled self-incrimination. Where the preparation of business records 
is voluntary, no compulsion is present.”) (citations omitted). 
 99. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 (illustrating that the act of producing 
documents may have “communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the 
contents of the papers produced”). 
 100. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75–76 (1906) (holding that an officer 
of a corporation cannot refuse to produce the books and papers of such a 
corporation when it has been charged with the violation of a statute). 
 101. See id. at 75 (“While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer 
incriminating questions . . . it does not follow that a corporation . . . may 
refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges.”). 
 102. Thomas J. Koffer, Note, All Quiet on the Paper Front:  Asserting a 
Fifth Amendment Privilege to Avoid Production of Corporate Documents in In 
re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated January 29, 1999, 46 
VILL. L. REV. 547, 557 (2001). 
 103. See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 383–84 (1911) (resolving 
the question left open in Hale about whether a corporate custodian may resist 
a subpoena for corporate documents by invoking his own Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination). 
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documents could not refuse to produce subpoenaed documents, 
even if the target of the investigation was the individual, not the 
corporation.104 Throughout the early and mid-twentieth 
century, the Court continued to expand the collective entity 
doctrine in deciding three cases.105 In 1913, the Supreme Court 
in Wheeler v. United States106 ruled that the collective entity 
doctrine encompassed subpoenaed documents of a dissolved 
corporation.107 In Wheeler, the Government served subpoenas 
duces tecum108 on Mr. Wheeler, the treasurer of Shaw, Inc., 
when the corporation dissolved.109 Wheeler argued that because 
the corporation was dissolved, he could exercise his privilege 
against self-incrimination and did not have to produce corporate 
documents.110 The Court disagreed and ordered the production 
of the subpoenaed documents pursuant to the collective entity 
doctrine, finding dissolution immaterial.111 
 
 104. See id. at 384 (“If the corporation were guilty of misconduct, he could 
not withhold its books to save it; and if he were implicated in the violations of 
law, he could not withhold the books to protect himself from the effect of their 
disclosures.”). 
 105. See Koffer, supra note 102, at 558 (providing the framework for the 
twentieth century expansion of the collective entity doctrine). 
 106. See Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 490 (1974) (holding that 
privilege of corporate officers against self-incrimination in the production of 
their own effects before a grand jury does not protect the former officers of a 
dissolved corporation in resisting compulsory production of those effects). 
 107. See id. (“Wheeler and Shaw had been officers of the corporation, and 
the books of the company had, before the dissolution, been made over to them; 
but this did not change the essential character of the books and papers, or 
make them anymore privileged to the investigation of crime than they were 
before.”). 
 108. See Subpoena, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A subpoena 
ordering the witness to appear in court and to bring specified documents, 
records, or things.”). 
 109. See Wheeler, 226 U.S. at 482–83 (“On the same day a subpoena duces 
tecum . . . was issued, summoning the corporation to appear before the grand 
jury and produce all the cash books, ledgers, journals, and other books of 
account of the company . . . .”). 
 110. See id. at 483–85 (outlining the reasons for the defendant’s refusal to 
produce the papers and records). 
 111. See id. at 488–90 (holding the dissolution of the corporation 
immaterial because the essential character of the documents did not change 
and were still corporate in nature). 
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Three decades after Wheeler, the Court expanded the 
collective entity doctrine to apply to labor unions in United 
States v. White.112 The expansion of the collective entity doctrine 
culminated in 1974 in Bellis v. United States.113 In Bellis, the 
petitioner, Isadore Bellis, was one of three partners at a small 
law firm until 1969 when he left the firm and the partnership 
dissolved.114 After the dissolution of the partnership, Bellis was 
served with subpoenas directing him to appear and testify 
before a grand jury and to produce all corporate documents in 
his possession.115 Bellis refused to produce corporate records, 
asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination.116 The Court refused to grant him protection 
under the Fifth Amendment, even though the partnership was 
dissolved and Bellis was only one of three partners at the 
firm.117 Instead, the Court found that because of the 
“inescapable fact that an artificial entity can only act to produce 
its records through its individual officers or agents, recognition 
of the individual’s claim of privilege . . . would . . . largely 
frustrate legitimate governmental regulation of such 
organizations.”118 
Wheeler, White, and Bellis paved the way for the most 
recent Supreme Court case regarding the collective entity 
 
 112. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700–01 (1974) (expanding 
the collective entity doctrine to apply to a labor union). 
 113. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 97 (1974) (finding that a 
partner holding subpoenaed records of the dissolved three-person law firm in 
a representative capacity, does not give the custodian of the corporate 
documents a greater claim of Fifth Amendment privilege and must produce 
those corporate documents). 
 114. See id. at 86 (“Until 1969, petitioner Isadore Bellis was the senior 
partner in Bellis, Kolsby & Wolf, a law firm in Philadelphia.”). 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. (“Petitioner appeared on May 9 but refused to produce the 
records, claiming, inter alia, his Fifth Amendment privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination.”). 
 117. See id. at 97 (“[T]he District Court . . . held that petitioner’s personal 
privilege did not extend to the partnership’s financial books and 
records . . . .”). 
 118. Id. at 90. 
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doctrine:  Braswell v. United States.119 The petitioner in 
Braswell initially operated his business as a sole proprietorship 
but then had it incorporated.120 Braswell was the sole 
shareholder of his corporation and he, his wife, and his mother 
held the only board and officer positions.121 The Court found the 
change from a sole proprietorship to a corporation critical 
because of the long-established treatment of the collective entity 
doctrine.122 The distinguishing feature between collective entity 
doctrine and the act-of-production doctrine is that “the collective 
entity doctrine applies in cases involving corporations and the 
act of production doctrine applies in cases involving sole 
proprietorships.”123 The Court reiterated that because a 
corporation acts through its agents, an individual acting in their 
corporate capacity is not protected against self-incrimination 
under the act-of-production doctrine.124 The Supreme Court 
ultimately rejected Braswell’s argument that the subpoenas 
requiring him to produce the books and records of the company 
 
 119. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 102 (1988) (holding that 
a corporate president could not use the act-of-production doctrine to shield him 
from producing corporate documents in his custodial capacity because the 
collective entity doctrine prevailed). 
 120. See id. at 100–01 (“From 1965 to 1980, petitioner Randy Braswell 
operated his business . . . as a sole proprietorship. In 1980, he incorporated 
Worldwide Machinery Sales, Inc., a Mississippi corporation, and began 
conducting the business through that entity.”). 
 121. Id. 
 122. See id. at 104 (“[P]etitioner has operated his business through the 
corporate form, and we have long recognized that, for purposes of the Fifth 
Amendment, corporations and other collective entities are treated differently 
from individuals.”). 
 123. Alice W. Yao, Comment, Former Corporate Officers and Employees in 
the Context of the Collective Entity and Act of Production Doctrines, 68 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1487, 1496 (2001). 
 124. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 107 (“The plain mandate of these decisions 
is that without regard to whether the subpoena is addressed to the 
corporation, or as here to the individual in his capacity as a custodian . . . a 
corporate custodian such as petitioner may not resist a subpoena for corporate 
records on Fifth Amendment grounds.”). 
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in which he served as president violated his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination.125 
The collective entity doctrine cases illustrate that as long as 
a business is incorporated, a representative in custody of 
business records may not refuse production, even if the business 
is small or the partnership has been  dissolved.126 Part V will 
discuss how this rule exposes individuals to civil liability, 
independent of any cause of action against the entity.127 
IV. The Alien Tort Statute Does Not Permit Individuals to Sue 
Foreign Corporations Acting Outside of the United States 
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) was created in the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 and states that “the district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.”128 The ATS was originally viewed solely as a 
jurisdictional statute, granting no new causes of action for 
plaintiffs.129 The ATS was only invoked a handful of times in the 
first 190 years after its enactment.130 The twenty-first century 
sequence of ATS cases began with Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.131 
In Sosa, plaintiff Umberto Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez) was 
abducted from Mexico and extradited to the United States, 
 
 125. See id. at 119 (“Consistent with our precedent, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that petitioner could not resist the 
subpoena for corporate documents on the ground that the act of production 
might tend to incriminate him. The judgment is therefore affirmed.”). 
 126. Supra discussion Part III. 
 127. Infra Part V. 
 128. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018). 
 129. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004) (“[T]he ATS is 
a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action . . . .”). 
 130. See Rebecca J. Hamilton, Jesner v. Arab Bank, 138 S. Ct. 1386 United 
States Supreme Court, April 24, 2018, 112 AM. J. INT’L 720, 720 (2018) (“After 
almost two centuries of dormancy, the ATS was revived at the urging of 
American human rights lawyers in 1980, ushering the modern era of 
transnational human rights litigation in U.S. courts.”). 
 131. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724 (finding that there was no violation of 
customary international law so well defined as to support creation of a cause 
of action that a district court could hear a claim under the ATS). 
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where he brought a civil action against Jose Francisco Sosa 
under the ATS for violation of the law of nations.132 The lower 
courts determined that Alvarez could bring a cause of action 
under the ATS for violation of the law of nations because the 
ATS provided a cause of action.133 On appeal to the Supreme 
Court, Sosa and the United States government argued the ATS 
only granted jurisdiction to the courts, and did not permit any 
new cause of action without express congressional 
authorization.134 The Court went through different historical 
interpretations of the ATS and determined it was jurisdictional 
in nature and limited to a narrow set of violations of the law of 
nations.135 The Court ultimately found that Alvarez’s claim of 
arbitrary detention did not violate any law of nations and 
therefore he could not bring a claim under the ATS.136 
Less than ten years after Sosa, the Supreme Court was 
presented with another ATS suit:  This time the issue involved 
the presumption against extraterritoriality.137 The petitioners 
in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co.138 were Nigerian nationals 
 
 132. See id. at 698 (“[P]etitioner Jose Francisco Sosa, abducted Alvarez 
from his house, held him overnight in a motel, and brought him by private 
plane to El Paso, Texas, where he was arrested by federal officers.”). 
 133. See id. at 699 (“The District Court . . . awarded summary judgment 
and $25,000 in damages to Alvarez on the ATS claim.”). 
 134. See id. at 712 (stating that the petitioners argued that “there is no 
relief under the ATS because the statute does no more than vest federal courts 
with jurisdiction”). 
 135. See id. at 724 (“[T]he reasonable inference from the historical 
materials is that the statute was intended to have the practical effect the 
moment it became law. The jurisdictional grant is best read as . . . provid[ing] 
a cause of action for the modest number of international law violations . . . .”). 
 136. See id. at 738 (“Whatever may be said for the broad principal Alvarez 
advances, in the present, imperfect world, it expresses an aspiration that 
exceeds any binding customary rule having the specificity we require.”). 
 137. See Ursula T. Doyle, The Whole Wide World:  Recognizing Jus Cogens 
Violations under the Alien Tort Statute, 24 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 45, 46 
(2018) (“[P]articularly since Kiobel, in which the Court held that the statutory 
canon of interpretation known as the ‘presumption against extraterritoriality’ 
applies to the ATS.”). 
 138. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117 (2013) 
(holding that principles underlying presumption against extraterritoriality 
constrains courts exercising their powers under the Alien Tort Statute). 
 
  
ARTIFICIAL ENTITIES WITH NATURAL RIGHTS 765 
 
residing in the United States and sued various Dutch, British, 
and Nigerian corporations under the ATS.139 The petitioners 
alleged that “Nigerian military and police forces attacked Ogoni 
villages, beating, raping, killing, and arresting residents” and 
the respondents aided and abetted the Nigerian government in 
these atrocities.140 Because these allegations of violence all 
occurred in Nigeria, to Nigerian nationals, the Court had to 
determine whether it could recognize a cause of action under the 
ATS.141 The respondents argued, and the Court agreed, that an 
ATS claim may not reach conduct solely occurring in a foreign 
sovereign.142 The presumption against extraterritoriality 
provided that if a statute did not indicate an extraterritorial 
reach, then it had none.143 The presumption against 
extraterritoriality reinforces the belief that United States’ law 
governs domestically, not globally.144 Using this policy 
consideration, the Court determined that because all the 
conduct took place in Nigeria, the petitioners’ claim of violations 
of the law of nations under the ATS was barred.145 Lastly, the 
Court said that the presumption against extraterritoriality as 
applied to ATS claims could only be displaced if the claims 
 
 139. See id. at 111 (outlining the background and posture of Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co.). 
 140. Id. at 113. 
 141. See id. at 111 (“The question presented is whether and under what 
circumstances courts may recognize a cause of action under the Alien Tort 
Statute, for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a 
sovereign other than the United States.”). 
 142. See id. at 115 (“Respondents contend that claims under the ATS do 
not, relying primarily on a canon of statutory interpretation known as the 
presumption against extraterritorial application.”). 
 143. See id. (“That canon provides that ‘[w]hen a statute gives no clear 
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none . . . .’”). 
 144. See id. (“[T]he ‘presumption that United States law governs 
domestically but does not rule the world . . . .’”) (citations omitted). 
 145. See id. at 124 (“We therefore conclude the presumption against 
extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and that nothing in the 
statute rebuts that presumption . . . and petitioners’ case seeking relief for 
violations of the law of nations occurring outside the United States is barred.”). 
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alleged “touch and concern” the United States and do so with 
“sufficient force.”146 
Most recently, in a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled 
on another ATS claim in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC,147 this time 
against a Jordanian bank that allegedly transferred funds to 
terrorist organizations.148 The petitioners in Jesner were 
persons or family members of persons injured or killed in 
various terrorist attacks in the Middle East.149 Petitioners 
sought to impose liability on the Arab Bank, a foreign 
corporation, for the acts of its employees, who allegedly knew 
the funds transferred were going to terrorist organizations.150 
The Court addressed the ATS claim by first determining 
“whether the law of nations impose[d] liability on corporations 
for human rights violations committed by its employees.”151 
After addressing the first issue, the Court then determined 
“whether it ha[d] authority and discretion in an ATS suit to 
impose liability on a corporation without a specific direction 
from Congress to do so.”152 
Arab Bank was a predominately Jordanian bank, but had 
branches all across the world, including in New York City.153 
Petitioners alleged Arab Bank cleared dollar-denominated 
 
 146. See id. at 125 (“Corporations are often present in many countries, and 
it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices. If Congress 
were to determine otherwise, a statute more specific than the ATS would be 
required.”). 
 147. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1403 (2018) (holding 
that liability under the Alien Tort Statute will not be extended to foreign 
corporations unless Congress takes further action). 
 148. See id. at 1393 (“Some of Arab Bank’s officials, it is alleged, allowed 
the Bank to be used to transfer funds to terrorist groups in the Middle East, 
which in turn enabled or facilitated criminal acts of terrorism, causing deaths 
or injuries for which petitioners now seek compensation.”). 
 149. Id. 
 150. See id. at 1394 (“Petitioners contend that international and domestic 
laws impose responsibility and liability on a corporation if its human agents 
use the corporation to commit crimes in violation of international laws that 
protect human rights.”). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 
  
ARTIFICIAL ENTITIES WITH NATURAL RIGHTS 767 
 
transactions through its New York branch, some of which went 
directly to the benefit of terrorist organizations in the Middle 
East.154 It is common practice for foreign banks to use their 
United States branch for dollar-denominated transactions 
through the Clearing House Interbank Payments System 
(CHIPS), which occur without human assistance.155 Arab 
Bank’s connection with New York through its New York branch 
was the relationship petitioners relied on when bringing suit.156 
The Court began by deciding whether the Petitioner’s claim 
passed the Sosa test, specifically, “whether a plaintiff [could] 
demonstrate that the alleged violation [was] of a norm that is 
specific, universal, and obligatory.”157 Because, unlike Sosa, the 
claim was against an entity, the Court looked at footnote 20 of 
the Sosa Court of Appeals opinion, which raised doubt about 
whether corporations may be liable for violations of 
international law and norms.158 In footnote 20, the Sosa Court 
said that “a related consideration is whether international law 
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to 
the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor 
such as a corporation or individual.”159 When interpreting 
footnote 20, the Jesner Court ultimately decided principles of 
international law did not extend liability “for human-rights 
 
 154. See id. (“[P]etitioners allege as well that Arab Bank used its New 
York branch to clear dollar-denominated transactions through the Clearing 
House Interbank Payment System . . . commonly referred to as CHIPS.”). 
 155. Id. at 1394–95. 
 156. See id. at 1393 (“Petitioners seek to prove Arab Bank helped the 
terrorists receive the moneys in part by means of currency clearances and 
bank transactions passing through its New York City offices, all by means of 
electronic transfers.”). 
 157. Id. at 1399 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004)). 
 158. See id. at 1399–400 
In the course of holding that international norms must be 
‘sufficiently definite to support a cause of action,’ the Court in Sosa 
noted that a ‘related consideration is whether international law 
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the 
perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a 
corporation or individual. 
 159. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004). 
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violations to corporations or other artificial entities.”160 The 
Court determined that “absent further action from Congress it 
would be inappropriate for courts to extend ATS liability to 
foreign corporations.”161 When deferring to Congress, the Court 
noted that the only cause of action created by Congress under 
the ATS was the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) and that 
the rest were court-made.162 The Court stated that foreign 
corporations were not subject to liability under ATS because the 
TVPA “limits liability to ‘individuals,’ which, the Court has held, 
unambiguously limits liability to natural persons.”163 The Court 
assumed that because the only Congress-made cause of action 
under ATS was limited to individuals, then the Court should not 
extend the scope to corporations.164 
The Court reasoned that foreign plaintiffs harmed by 
corporations still had remedies available because they could sue 
individual corporate employees under the ATS.165 The Court 
also reasoned that foreign corporations should not be liable 
under ATS because if the United States allowed lawsuits 
against foreign corporations, foreign sovereigns would respond 
by haling American corporations into their courts for violating 
the law of nations.166 The Court was concerned that setting this 
standard would dissuade American corporations from investing 
and doing business abroad, especially in regions with a history 
 
 160. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1400 (2018) (noting 
that this is confirmed by the fact that international criminal tribunals often 
exclude corporations from their jurisdictional reach). 
 161. Id. at 1403. 
 162. See id. (“Here, the logical place to look for a statutory analogy to an 
ATS common-law action is the TVPA—the only cause of action under the ATS 
created by Congress rather than the courts.”). 
 163. Id. at 1404. 
 164. See id. (“Congress’ decision to exclude liability for corporations in 
actions brought under the TPVA is all but dispositive of the present case.”). 
 165. See id. at 1405 (“[P]laintiffs still can sue the individual corporate 
employees responsible for a violation of international law under the ATS.”). 
 166. See id. (“This judicially mandated doctrine, in turn, could subject 
American corporations to an immediate, constant risk of claims seeking to 
impose massive liability for the alleged conduct of their employees and 
subsidiaries around the world . . . .”). 
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of human rights violations.167 Lastly, the Court stated that the 
purpose of the ATS was to “promote harmony in international 
relations” and in the current lawsuit, the opposite was 
occurring.168 With all of these considerations in mind, the Court 
affirmed the Court of Appeals judgment dismissing the 
petitioners’ ATS claims.169 
V. Analysis of the Case Law 
Unfortunately for legal scholars, law students, and the 
general members of society, “there is no consistent, unified 
approach across the Court’s corporate constitutional personhood 
cases.”170 This Part is meant to synthesize the outcomes and 
reasoning of the cases discussed in Parts II–IV. This Part first 
highlights the similar effects the cases have, then considers 
inherent contradictions in the Court’s reasoning in the cases 
previously discussed, and lastly proposes a more unified 
framework with which to assess corporation’s rights. 
Despite the inconsistent way in which the Court has chosen 
to assign rights to corporations, there are some similarities in 
the results. Specifically, “the collective entity doctrine and the 
Citizens United/Hobby Lobby line of cases may share a common 
disregard for the interests of employees and minority 
shareholders.”171 Notwithstanding the reality that granting 
corporations political speech rights may silence the speech of 
 
 167. See id. at 1406 (“In other words, allowing plaintiffs to sue foreign 
corporations under the ATS could establish a precedent that discourages 
American corporations from investing abroad, including in developing 
economies where the host government might have a history of alleged human-
rights violations . . . .”). 
 168. See id. (“The ATS was intended to promote harmony in international 
relations by ensuring foreign plaintiffs a remedy for international-law 
violations in circumstances where the absence of such a remedy might provoke 
foreign nations to hold the United States accountable.”). 
 169. See id. at 1408 (“For these reasons, judicial deference requires that 
any imposition of corporate liability on foreign corporations for violations of 
international law must be determined in the first instance by the political 
branches of Government.”). 
 170. Robinson, supra note 4, at 625. 
 171. Ackerman & Cole, supra note 32, at 911. 
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minority shareholders as well as the general public, the Court 
in Citizens United quickly brushed that concern aside, 
dismissing it as not determinative of the case.172 Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence in Citizens United went into great detail about 
when it comes to freedom of speech, the identity of the speaker 
does not matter.173 He concluded that “the [First] Amendment 
is written in terms of speech, not speakers” and there is no basis 
for “excluding any category of speaker, from the single 
individuals to partnerships of individuals, to unincorporated 
associations of individuals, to incorporated associations of 
individuals.”174 If, at the time of the Constitutional Convention, 
corporations were “legally privileged organizations that had to 
be closely scrutinized by the legislature because their purposes 
had to be made consistent with the public welfare,”175 then 
should our country and our Courts prioritize, emphasize, and 
facilitate individual’s political voices? Perhaps in line with that 
concern over corporate power, after Citizens United, there was 
great resistance:  “As of 2016, sixteen states and hundreds of 
municipalities had endorsed a constitutional amendment to 
overturn Citizens United and clarify that constitutional rights 
belong to human beings, not corporations.”176 
In stark contrast to the Court in Citizens United, the 
Braswell Court found the distinction between a sole 
proprietorship and an artificial entity dispositive.177 The 
 
 172. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 57, at 1024 (“When the Supreme 
Court held in Citizens United v. FEC that corporations have a First 
Amendment right to make unlimited, independent campaign expenditures, it 
dismissed in a few sentences the idea that the corporate leadership’s use of 
corporate resources on politics might infringe the rights of dissenting 
shareholders.”). 
 173. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 392–93 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (arguing that the concern of the First Amendment is the speech, 
not the speaker). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 427 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
 176. WINKLER, supra note 12, at xvi. 
 177. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 110 (1988) (“Artificial 
entities such as corporations act only through their agents, and a custodian’s 
assumption of his representative capacity leads to certain obligations, 
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moment one incorporates, even if he/she is the sole shareholder, 
the newly formed corporation is not protected by the right 
against self-incrimination.178 In Braswell, the distinction 
between corporations and sole proprietorships directly conflicts 
with the reasoning given in Hobby Lobby when the majority said 
religious protection does not discriminate between corporations 
and sole proprietorships.179 Although the Court made the 
blanket statement that RFRA does not discriminate between 
for-profit corporations and sole proprietorships or partnerships, 
it did not substantiate that statement.180 The Hobby Lobby 
Court rhetorically asked “[i]f . . . a sole proprietorship that 
seeks to make a profit may assert a free-exercise claim, why 
can’t Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel do the same?”181 The 
Court justified not drawing the distinction between artificial 
entities and individuals based on the theory that corporations 
are associations of the people, and the individual’s beliefs cannot 
be separated from the corporation’s.182 It is difficult to reconcile 
the Court’s willingness to extend political speech rights and 
religious freedoms to corporations in Hobby Lobby and Citizens 
 
including the duty to produce corporate records on proper demand by the 
Government.”). 
 178. See id. at 102 (“The court rejected petitioner’s argument that the 
collective entity doctrine does not apply when a corporation is so small that it 
constitutes nothing more than the individual’s alter ego.”). 
 179. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 691 (2014) 
(“The plain terms of RFRA make it perfectly clear that Congress did not 
discriminate in this way against men and women who wish to run their 
businesses as for-profit corporations in the manner required by their religious 
beliefs.”). 
 180. See id. at 692 (“Although HHS has made this system available to 
religious nonprofits that have religious objections to the contraceptive 
mandate, HHS has provided no reason why the same system cannot be made 
available when the owners of for-profit corporations have similar religious 
objections.”). 
 181. Id. at 710. 
 182. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010) (“The Court has 
thus rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or other 
associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment simply 
because such associations are not ‘natural persons.’”). 
 
  
772 26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 743 (2020) 
 
United, but refuse to do so for the right against 
self-incrimination in Braswell.183 
“Corporations are the major players of the twenty-first 
century,”184 and our Courts ought to hold them to a higher level 
of accountability. In Jesner v. Arab Bank, the Court was 
concerned that allowing an ATS suit against a corporate 
defendant would set bad precedent around the world, when in 
reality, “the picture emerging from America’s highest court is of 
a playing field in which corporations enjoy plenty of rights, and 
the rest of us face a shrinking set of tools to hold them 
accountable.”185 In light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Jesner, 
international litigation in the United States for violation of 
human rights by foreign corporations is no longer an option 
under the ATS.186 While Jesner did not completely eliminate the 
ATS, “it may reasonably be viewed as its 990th paper cut.”187 
In the realm of freedom of political speech and religion, the 
privilege against self-incrimination, and protection against 
being sued under the Alien Tort Statute, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the Constitution and various federal laws in favor 
of corporations—sometimes to the detriment of individuals. The 
Court’s personification of corporations has gotten more extreme 
and tends to directly contradict the objectives of corporate 
 
 183. See Ackerman & Cole, supra note 32, at 910–11 
[T]he Braswell Court’s acknowledgement that, under the collective 
entity doctrine, incorporation can deprive the incorporator(s) of 
their constitutional rights under the Self-Incrimination Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment, stands in stark contrast to the view of 
corporate personhood that the Court accepted 20-plus years later in 
Citizens United and Hobby Lobby. 
 184. Hamilton, supra note 130, at 726. 
 185. Todd Tucker, Is the Supreme Court Going Too Easy on Overseas 
Corporations?, POLITICO (May 8, 2018), https://www.politico.com/agenda
/story/2018/05/08/supreme-court-overseas-corporate-accountability-000659 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2020) [https://perma.cc/Q8FS-ABHF]. 
 186. See Hamilton, supra note 130, at 720 (“The exclusion of transnational 
human rights litigation from U.S. federal courts is, for most practical 
purposes, now complete.”). 
 187. See id. at 724 (“In its heyday, some two decades ago, the ATS was a 
beacon of hope for survivors of human rights atrocities. That period is now 
over. . . . What remains of the ATS is highly circumscribed.”). 
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law.188 With its various holdings, the Court has oscillated 
between focusing on who the claimant is when deciding if they 
are afforded a certain right and putting the emphasis on the 
purpose of the right itself.189 
A. Proposed Unified Framework 
This subpart proposes a more dependable framework with 
which various constitutional and legal rights could be assessed 
by the Court. While other scholars have proposed tests for the 
Court to use, their proposals have focused on corporate 
constitutional rights exclusively, not factoring in the harm done 
to individuals.190 When deciding whether a constitutional or 
statutory right applies to corporations, the Court should first 
look to the purpose of the right in question;  second, determine 
whether that purpose is achieved when the right is extended to 
corporations;  and lastly, consider the potential adverse impacts 
granting that right to corporations may have on individuals. 
This framework will be applied to each of the four constitutional 
and legal rights previously discussed in this Note.191 
Issues arose in the forgoing cases over whether or not 
corporations were protected under a certain constitutional 
provision or federal legislation. In Citizens United, the Court 
 
 188. See Ackerman & Cole, supra note 32, at 969 (“Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court’s expansive view of corporate rights and its limitation on the 
ability of the legislature—state or federal—to constrict those rights broadens 
the constitutionally protected functions of the corporation and repudiates 
those who would limit corporate objectives to only the maximization of 
shareholder profit.”). 
 189. See Robinson, supra 4, at 655–56 (“[T]he Court’s predominant focus 
has been on the right at issue rather than the claimant. . . . [There] are a 
number of examples where the court has held that the nature of the claimant 
is determinative of their constitutional personhood.”). 
 190. See Blair & Pollman, supra note 61, at 1679–80 (concluding that the 
Court has recognized corporate Constitutional rights as derivative rights, 
stemming from the people who comprise the corporation); see also Robinson, 
supra note 4, at 612 (proposing a “functional framework for determining 
constitutional personhood that focuses on the purpose of the right at issue, 
and measures the fit of the claimant with that purpose in order to determine 
whether constitutional personhood should vest”). 
 191. Infra Parts V.A.1–4. 
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grappled with the issue of whether the First Amendment’s 
freedom of political speech applied with equal force to 
corporations as to individuals;192 in Hobby Lobby, whether 
closely held corporations had religious protections under the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act;193 in Braswell, whether the 
collective entity doctrine precluded a sole shareholder of a 
corporation from invoking his right against self-incrimination 
when subpoenaed to produce corporate documents;194 and 
Jesner, whether the Alien Tort Statute could be used to sue a 
foreign corporation for tortious acts committed abroad.195 
1. Proposed Framework and Citizens United v. FEC 
The First Amendment’s protection of speech is moored in 
the United States’ notion of democracy.196 The purpose of the 
 
 192. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339–42 (2010) (determining 
the facial validity of § 441b, which disallowed corporations to use its general 
treasury funds to make independent political expenditures for speech that 
qualifies as electioneering communication). 
 193. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 688 (2014) 
We must decide in these cases whether the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) permits the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to demand that 
three closely held corporations provide health-insurance coverage 
for methods of contraception that violate the sincerely held religious 
beliefs of the companies’ owners. 
(citations omitted).  
 194. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 100 (1988) (“[W]hether 
the custodian of corporate records may resist a subpoena for such records on 
the ground that the act of production would incriminate him in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment.”). 
 195. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1394 (2018) (deciding 
whether the Court has the authority to make extend ATS liability to foreign 
corporations that commit crimes in violation of international laws, without 
express authorization from the legislature). 
 196. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (“Speech is an 
essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials 
accountable to the people.”); see also Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
765, 776 (1978) (“Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function 
in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or 
appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of 
their period.” (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940))). 
 
  
ARTIFICIAL ENTITIES WITH NATURAL RIGHTS 775 
 
right has been seen as a “fundamental component of the liberty 
safeguarded by the Due Process Clause.”197 In Citizens United, 
the Court stressed that the purpose of the fundamental right of 
political speech protects the speech itself, irrespective of the 
identity of the speaker.198 Under the theory that the right 
protects speech without taking into consideration the identity of 
the speaker, extending the right to corporations was a natural 
extension according to the Court.199 The Court took the stance 
that because § 441b prohibited corporations from making 
independent political contributions, the law was an 
unconstitutional ban on political speech.200 The dissent, 
however, pointed out that there have been several instances in 
which limiting political speech has been upheld without 
violating the purpose of the right.201 Additionally, despite the 
fact that corporations were permitted to make unlimited 
donations through political action committees (PACs), the Court 
still found § 441b’s restriction to violate the First 
Amendment.202 The Court reasoned that because PACs are 
created by corporations, their donations are not corporate 
speech, and even if it was, PACs are “burdensome alternatives” 
and “expensive to administer.”203 What the Court did not 
 
 197. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 780. 
 198. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 347 (“[T]he First Amendment does 
not allow political speech restrictions based on a speaker’s corporate 
identity.”). 
 199. See id. at 342 (“This protection has been extended by explicit holdings 
to the context of political speech. Under the rationale of these precedents, 
political speech does not lose First Amendment protection ‘simply because its 
source is a corporation.’” (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784)). 
 200. See id. at 339 (“If § 441b applied to individuals, no one would believe 
that it is merely a time, place, or manner restriction on speech. Its purpose 
and effect are to silence entities whose voices the Government deems to be 
suspect.”). 
 201. See id. at 423 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“These statutes burden the 
political expression of one class of speakers, namely, civil servants.”). 
 202. See id. at 337 (majority opinion) (“Section 441b is a ban on corporate 
speech notwithstanding the fact that a PAC created by a corporation can still 
speak.”). 
 203. See id. 
A PAC is a separate association from a corporation. So the PAC 
exemption from § 441b’s expenditure ban, § 441b(b)(2), does not 
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address in great detail was the possible ramifications its ruling 
would have on individuals. 
Even if the Court in Citizens United accomplished steps one 
and two of the proposed framework—concluding that the 
purpose of political speech is to promote democracy, which 
should not be burdened, and that that purpose was furthered by 
affording political speech to corporations—it did not adequately 
account for the harm which would result to individuals. The law 
at issue in Citizens United “target[ed] a class of communications 
that is especially likely to corrupt the political process, that is 
at least one degree removed from the views of individual 
citizens, and that may not even reflect the views of those who 
pay for it.”204 While the Court focused on corporations being 
deprived of its political speech rights, it did not seriously take 
into consideration the impact its holding had on the 
shareholders of those corporations.205 The issue of dissenting or 
minority shareholders was swiftly punted off as an issue of 
corporate democracy, and therefore not a sufficient reason to 
restrict corporate political expenditures.206 
The dissent went into greater detail about how 
shareholders might be affected by letting corporations make 
unlimited political contributions.207 Specifically, some 
shareholders might have their financial investments “used to 
undermine their political convictions.”208 Although the majority 
 
allow corporations to speak. Even if a PAC could somehow allow a 
corporation to speak—and it does not—the option to form PACs 
does not alleviate the First Amendment problems with § 441b. 
 204. Id. at 419 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 205. See id. at 361–62 (majority opinion) (“There is, furthermore, little 
evidence of [abuse] that cannot be corrected by shareholders ‘through the 
procedures of corporate democracy.’” (citing Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 
U.S. 765, 794 (1978))). 
 206. See id. (dispensing with the Government’s argument that corporate 
independent expenditures can be limited to protect dissenting shareholders 
from being compelled to fund corporate political speech). 
 207. See id. at 476 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing unlimited corporate 
political contributions as coerced speech for shareholders who do not support 
the cause). 
 208. See id. at 475 (noting that the shareholders foot the bill to fund the 
political cause the corporation decides to support). 
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said this potential harm could be remedied through corporate 
democracy and breach of fiduciary duty lawsuits, a favorable 
result for shareholders is unlikely, and the injury has already 
occurred.209 Despite the Court’s assumption that shareholders 
could protect themselves through corporate governance, a study 
found that “shareholders were not able to protect themselves 
from misuse of corporate funds for political purposes prior to 
Citizens United, and the risk of such misuse has increased as a 
result of the decision.”210 
Not only does giving freedom of political speech to 
corporations in the form of political spending hurt minority 
shareholders, it also undermines individuals’ speech.211 
Allowing unlimited political spending by corporations for use in 
advertising and campaigning will inevitably lead to the 
silencing of the voices of individuals and grassroots efforts in 
elections.212 There is a recognized concern that allowing 
powerful corporations to use their vast economic power to 
contribute to political campaigns can drown out the voices of the 
voters during the electoral process.213 
 
 209. See id. at 477 (“By ‘corporate democracy,’ presumably the Court 
means the rights of shareholders to vote and to bring derivative suits for 
breach of fiduciary duty. In practice, however, many corporate lawyers will tell 
you that ‘these rights are so limited as to be almost nonexistent . . . .’”). 
 210. John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before 
and After Citizens United, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 657, 659 (2012). 
 211. See Imtanes, supra note 34, at 212 (“Democracy is supposed to be 
based on the popular vote of the people. Corporations that exert unlimited 
amounts of money to campaign advertising cause increased control over the 
outcome of elections. Corporate speech after Citizens United may overwhelm 
individual speech.”). 
 212. See id. at 213 (“A threat to democracy may result from corporate 
campaigns and advertising overshadowing and overpowering the voice of the 
average person.”). 
 213. See Ackerman & Cole, supra note 32, at 915 (“It has long been 
recognized however, that the special status of corporations has placed them in 
a position to control vast amounts of economic power which may, if not 
regulated, dominate not only the economy but also the very heart of our 
democracy, the electoral process.” (citing Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 
U.S. 765, 809 (1978))). 
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2. Proposed Framework and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
In Hobby Lobby, the Court considered the purpose behind 
the religious protections granted in the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA).214 When looking at the statutory 
history of RFRA, the Court found it was enacted “in order to 
provide very broad protection for religious liberty.”215 RFRA’s 
enactment was in response to several Supreme Court decisions 
that criticized religious exemption challenges to laws of general 
application and enforcement.216 Congress responded to this 
criticism by declaring that laws which appeared to be “neutral” 
towards religion, “may burden religious exercise as surely as 
laws intended to interfere with religious exercise.”217 It is 
evident from the legislative history that the purpose of RFRA 
was to protect the exercise of religion, even from laws of general 
applicability. 
What is less clear is whether that protection should extend 
to for-profit corporations. The question over whether the HHS 
mandate should apply to corporations was considered because, 
when enacting the contraceptive mandate, HHS intentionally 
included an exemption for religious nonprofits corporations.218 
The text of the statute specifically prohibited the “Government 
[from] substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion 
even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability.”219 Despite the fact that the text of the statute 
explicitly said a “person’s exercise of religion,” the Court 
nevertheless determined that “persons” included 
 
 214. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 693–94 (2014) 
(discussing the RFRA). 
 215. See id. at 693 (providing the enactment history of the RFRA). 
 216. See id. at 694 (“Congress responded to Smith by enacting RFRA.”). 
 217. See id. (reviewing the congressional findings that served as the 
foundation behind the RFRA). 
 218. See id. at 688–92 (describing the HSS’s contraceptive mandate 
exemption for religious nonprofit corporations which ensures the employees of 
these organizations have the same access to the contraceptives as an employee 
of a company who does not have a religious exemption). 
 219. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1a (2018) (emphasis added). 
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corporations.220 The Court failed to mention, but the dissent 
eagerly pointed out, that when RFRA was passed, the Senate 
voted down an amendment “which would have enabled any 
employer or insurance provider to deny coverage based on its 
asserted religious beliefs or moral convictions.”221 In light of the 
Senate’s decision, it seemed as though Congress purposely 
decided not to leave health care choices, including contraceptive 
methods, to the discretion of employers.222 Additionally, the 
Court had never before, until the instant case, granted for-profit 
corporations a “religious exemption from a generally applicable 
law.”223 Looking at the text of the statute, the legislative history, 
and case precedent, it seems as though RFRA was not meant to 
apply to for-profit corporations. 
Even if the Court was convinced that RFRA applied to 
for-profit corporations, it did not adequately take into account 
the harm granting these corporations religious protections has 
on individual employees. A potential negative result of the 
holding was the disenfranchisement of individual employees, by 
potentially only valuing majority shareholders or owners.224 The 
dissent and the Department of Health and Human Services 
made compelling arguments about the grave implications the 
 
 220. See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 707–08 (“Thus, unless there is 
something about the RFRA context that ‘indicates otherwise,’ the Dictionary 
Act provides a quick, clear, and affirmative answer to the question whether 
the companies involved in these cases may be heard.”). 
 221. Id. at 744 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 222. See id. (“Rejecting the ‘conscience amendment,’ Congress left health 
care decisions—including the choice among contraceptive methods—in the 
hands of women, with the aid of their health care providers.”). 
 223. See id. at 751–52 (“The absence of such precedent is just what one 
would expect, for the exercise of religion is characteristic of natural persons, 
not artificial legal entities.”). 
 224. See Ackerman & Cole, supra note 32, at 925 (“[T]he Citizens United 
and Hobby Lobby holdings strongly suggest that the only human beings that 
count in corporations are the ones who control them. The people who are 
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majority’s decision and interpretation of RFRA had on third 
parties.225 
The dissent went into greater detail on the potential 
consequences of denying women these four contraceptives.226 
For example, corporations wanted to exclude intrauterine 
devices (IUDs) under the mandate.227 Excluding IUDs is 
problematic because they are attractive to employees because of 
their effectiveness but they are more expensive to pay for out of 
pocket.228 Specifically, a report showed that the average cost of 
an IUD is approximately equal to “a month’s full-time pay for 
workers earning the minimum wage.”229 Shifting this cost to 
women employees because the family owners of a for-profit 
corporation had religious objections may have weighed more 
heavily into the majority’s decisions had it used the framework 
set forth here. The Court disregarded the potential health 
impacts its decision would have on thousands of female 
employees and their dependents who do not share the same 
religious beliefs as their employers.230 
3. Proposed Framework and Braswell v. United States 
Applying the framework set forth in this Note to Braswell, 
the purpose of the protection against self-incrimination must 
 
 225. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 740 (2014) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
In the Court’s view, RFRA demands accommodation of a for-profit 
corporation’s religious beliefs no matter the impact that 
accommodation may have on third parties who do not share the 
corporation owners’ religious faith—in these cases, thousands of 
women employed by Hobby Lobby and Conestoga or dependents of 
persons those corporations employ. 
 226. See id. at 761 (“The coverage helps safeguard the health of women for 
whom pregnancy may be hazardous, even life threatening.”). 
 227. See id. (discussing the contraceptives for which Hobby Lobby and 
Conestoga resisted coverage). 
 228. See id. (explaining the problem with excluding IUDs from coverage). 
 229. Id. at 762. 
 230. See Blair & Pollman, supra note 61, at 1730 (“The majority’s analysis 
disregarded the impact on thousands of employees and dependents who do not 
share the religious faith of the shareholders.”). 
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first be explored. The purpose of the right against 
self-incrimination is to protect individuals from exposing 
themselves, not a third party, to liability—criminal or civil.231 
Because the privilege against self-incrimination has been long 
recognized, the Braswell Court adopted much of the reasoning 
about its purpose from past cases.232 The nature of the privilege 
against self-incrimination stems from a deeply personal level, 
which can apply only to individuals.233 Our justice system has 
held this right in high regard, even though the privilege is 
sometimes subject to misuse.234 The privilege against 
self-incrimination is meant to protect individuals from any 
disclosure of words, documents, or chattels sought to be used 
against him or her in a legal proceeding.235 
Because of the foregoing reasons, the Court declined to 
extend the right against self-incrimination to corporations and 
other business entities pursuant to the collective entity 
doctrine.236 The Court declined to extend the right to 
corporations and other artificial entities, making this the “only 
provision of the Bill of Rights that the Supreme Court has held 
to be completely unavailable to corporations and other business 
entities.”237 Because the privilege against self-incrimination is a 
 
 231. See Lance Cole, Reexamining the Collective Entity Doctrine in the New 
Era of Limited Liability Entities—Should Business Entities Have a Fifth 
Amendment Privilege?, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 15 (2005) 
First, the Court made clear that the privilege against 
self-incrimination is a personal privilege that cannot be asserted by 
a witness to protect a third party from prosecution, whether the 
third party is another individual or a corporation and whether or 
not the witness is an agent of the third party. 
 232. See generally Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 103–09 (1988). 
 233. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944) (noting that the 
privilege against self-incrimination grows out of the regard our jurisprudence 
has for dignity, humanity and impartiality). 
 234. See id. at 698–99 (“While the privilege is subject to abuse and misuse, 
it is firmly embedded in our constitutional and legal framework as a bulwark 
against iniquitous methods of prosecution.”). 
 235. Id. at 699. 
 236. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 104 (“[F]or the purposes of the Fifth 
Amendment, corporations and other collective entities are treated differently 
from individuals.”). 
 237. Cole, supra note 231, at 10. 
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personal one, it cannot be used by or on behalf of any corporation 
or business organization.238 Through a series of cases, 
culminating with Braswell, the Court expanded the collective 
entity doctrine to prevent a sole shareholder of a corporation, 
which was previously operated as a sole proprietorship, from 
invoking his Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination.239 The distinction between a sole 
proprietorship and a collective entity is important when 
determining whether the purpose of the privilege against 
self-incrimination is fulfilled when extended to corporations.240 
When individuals act as representatives for an organization, 
they are not exercising their own individual rights, “rather they 
assume the rights, duties and privileges of the artificial entity” 
and have no privilege against self-incrimination.241  
When denying protection against self-incrimination to 
corporations, individual agents of the corporations are the ones 
who must produce the corporate documents, often themselves 
becoming subject to parallel civil or criminal proceedings.242 The 
nature of investigations results in law enforcement targeting 
both the companies and the individuals who work for those 
companies simultaneously.243 The risk of parallel proceedings 
has the potential to harm litigants because a litigant is often not 
 
 238. White, 322 U.S. at 699. 
 239. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 101–02 (“The District Court denied the 
motion to quash, ruling that the ‘collective entity doctrine’ prevented 
petitioner from asserting that his act of producing the corporations’ records 
was protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.”). 
 240. See id. at 104 (“Had petitioner conducted his business as a sole 
proprietorship, Doe would require that he be provided the opportunity to show 
that his act of production would entail testimonial self-incrimination.”). 
 241. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944). 
 242. See 13 BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LITIGIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS 
§ 131:15 (4th ed.) (explaining that for the past forty years, the Supreme Court 
has recognized the government’s ability to conduct simultaneous civil and 
criminal investigations). 
 243. See John C. Coffee, Jr., No Soul to Damn:  No Body to Kick:  An 
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. 
REV. 386, 387 (1981) (“[L]aw enforcement officials cannot afford to ignore 
either the individual or the firm in choosing their targets, but can realize 
important economies of scale by simultaneously pursuing both.”). 
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informed there is more than one investigation happening, and 
some courts do not require disclosure of concurrent 
investigations.244 There are significant risks for litigants 
involved in civil proceedings because they may also be potential 
targets in criminal investigations.245 For example, if a litigant 
chooses to testify at a civil proceeding, he or she may expose 
himself/herself to criminal prosecutors in the process of building 
a case against the litigant, or others involved in the matter.246 
The Court in Braswell acknowledged the dangers of 
requiring a corporate custodian of company records to produce 
documents because the act of production may personally 
incriminate the individual.247 Acknowledging the threat, the 
Court decided to strike a balance.248 Evidentiary immunity, as 
the Court established in Braswell under the collective entity 
doctrine, is far narrower than immunity under 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 
6002, 6003 which apply to those who assert their Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination under the 
act-of-production doctrine.249 Sections 6002 and 6003 require a 
 
 244. See 13 BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LITIGIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS 
§ 131:15 (“The [Ninth Circuit] also noted that, although the government may 
not ‘affirmatively mislead the subject of parallel civil and criminal 
investigations,’ the SEC had no affirmative duty to inform witnesses of an 
existing or contemplated criminal investigation.” (citing United States v. 
Stringer, 535 F.3d 929, 940–41 (9th Cir. 2008))). 
 245. See id. (“Because parallel proceedings may arise in a government 
investigation of almost any commercial transaction in which allegations of 
fraud have been made, counsel representing a client in an investigation 
involving the SEC should carefully consider whether a related criminal 
investigation may have commenced.”). 
 246. See id. (“Litigants in civil proceedings who are also the potential 
subjects or targets of criminal investigations face significant risks.”). 
 247. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 117–18 (1988) (“Although 
a corporate custodian is not entitled to resist a subpoena on the ground that 
his act of production will be personally incriminating, we do think certain 
consequences flow from the fact that the custodian’s act of production is one 
in his representative rather than personal capacity.”). 
 248. See id. at 118 (stating that the custodian must produce the corporate 
records, even if personally incriminating, but the government is prohibited 
from making direct evidentiary use of the act of production in any subsequent 
prosecution of the custodian). 
 249. See SARAH SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 6:14 
(2d ed. 2019) (“[T]he government cannot take the inconsistent position of 
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witness to testify or provide information pursuant to a court 
order, and that information may not be “used against the 
witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, 
giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the 
order.”250 Evidentiary immunity is the automatic protection a 
witness gets when forced to produce corporate documents.251 
While evidentiary immunity may seem sufficient to protect 
individuals, it often is not because in an independent criminal 
prosecution of the corporate custodian, the government may 
present evidence the corporation produced certain documents, 
without saying who produced the documents.252 This merely 
leaves the jury to draw the line between the criminal defendant 
custodian, who potentially was the sole shareholder of the 
corporation, and the fact that he produced the incriminating 
documents.253 In practice, the collective entity doctrine allows 
prosecutors to get the corporate documents without granting 
full transactional immunity, leaving the producing individual 
only evidentiary immunity.254 
The purpose of the privilege against self-incrimination is a 
purely personal one and does not seem to nicely extend to 
corporations. However, when looking at how the Court has in 
the past made exceptions for certain types of corporations when 
granting rights—in Hobby Lobby with religious protections for 
 
demanding that the particular individual produce corporate records in his 
representative capacity, and then advise the jury at trial that that individual 
was the person who produced them . . . .”). 
 250. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002–6003 (2018). 
 251. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 118 (“Therefore the government concedes, 
as it must, that it may make no evidentiary use of the ‘individual act’ against 
the individual.”). 
 252. See id. (“The government has the right, however, to use the 
corporation’s act of production against the custodian.”). 
 253. See id. (“Because the jury is not told that the defendant produced the 
records, any nexus between the defendant and the documents results solely 
from the corporation’s act of production and other evidence in the case.”). 
 254. See Cole, supra note 231, at 53–54 (“More important for purposes of 
the collective entity doctrine, it makes it possible for investigators and 
prosecutors to compel a business entity to produce documents and records 
without granting full transactional immunity to the entity, thus leaving open 
the option of subsequently prosecuting the entity.”). 
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close corporations but not publicly traded corporations—a 
similar exception can be made for the privilege against 
self-incrimination. After balancing the purpose of the right and 
how it can be fulfilled when extended to artificial entities with 
the harm done to individuals by not extending the right to 
corporations, the Court can modify the existing rule to give 
entities with only one single shareholder protection under the 
Fifth Amendment. 
4. Proposed Framework and Jesner v. Arab Bank 
In Jesner, the Court determined that the ATS did not 
extend to suits against foreign corporations.255 The scope of the 
ATS at the time of its enactment pertained to violations of “safe 
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and 
piracy.”256 Specifically, what prompted the enactment of the 
ATS was a series foreign-relations problems, for which the 
government had no adequate remedies under the Articles of 
Confederation.257 In reaching this decision, the Court looked at 
the history and purpose of the ATS, finding that its objective 
was to “avoid foreign entanglements,”258 specifically, 
international comity was the primary purpose for enacting the 
ATS.259 The ATS was not meant to be a divisive statute, but 
 
 255. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407 (2018) (“[T]he Court 
holds that foreign corporations may not be defendants in suits brought under 
the ATS.”). 
 256. Id. at 1397. 
 257. See id. at 1396 
In 1784, the French Minister lodged a protest with the Continental 
Congress after a French adventurer . . . assaulted the Secretary of 
the French Legion in Philadelphia. . . .A few years later, a New 
York constable caused an international incident when he entered 
the house of the Dutch Ambassador and arrested one of his 
servants. 
 258. See id. at 1397 (stating that the purpose in enacting the ATS was to 
avoid foreign entanglements by ensuring the availability of a federal forum, 
since failing to have one could cause another nation to hold the United States 
responsible for an injury to a foreign citizen). 
 259. See Doyle, supra note 137, at 58 (“However, comity was, in fact, the 
reason that Congress passed the ATS, and it might require the exercise rather 
than the rejection of jurisdiction.”). 
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rather was “intended to promote harmony in international 
relations.”260 
There was not much argument over the purpose of the ATS 
between the parties in Jesner or between the majority and the 
dissent. The major controversy, and ultimately the deciding 
point of the case, was over whether the ATS was meant to 
encompass suits against foreign corporations.261 After the 
decision in Kiobel, it was left unresolved whether the ATS 
extends to suits against foreign corporations.262 Due to the 
uncertainty after Kiobel, some legal scholars still believed that 
the decision did not bar ATS claims against certain foreign 
corporations.263  
The Court in Jesner gave an overview of when international 
courts granted jurisdiction over natural persons, starting with 
the Nuremberg Tribunal, which was the prosecution of those 
involved in the atrocities at concentration camps during World 
War II.264 The Court went on to list other instances where the 
scope of jurisdiction was limited to individuals, such as the 
United States Military Tribunal in its prosecution of “24 
executives of the German corporation IG Farber;”265 the “Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court;”266 and several 
other examples of the international community’s decision to 
 
 260. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1406. 
 261. See id. at 1398 (“With these principles in mind, this Court now must 
decide whether common-law liability under the ATS extends to a foreign 
corporate defendant.”). 
 262. See id. at 1395 (“The rationale of the holding, however, was not that 
the ATS does not extend to suits against foreign corporations. That question 
was left unresolved.”). 
 263. See Doyle, supra note 137, at 66–67 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s narrow 
holding in Kiobel should not bar claims against U.S. corporations or claims 
against foreign corporations with substantial ties to the United States.” 
(quoting Professor Beth Stephens)). 
 264. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1400 (2018) (“The Charter 
for the Nuremberg Tribunal, created by the Allies after World War II, provided 
that the Tribunal had jurisdiction over natural persons only.”). 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 1401. 
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limit the authority of the tribunals to natural persons.267 The 
petitioners in Jesner argued to extend the ATS to suits against 
foreign corporations by giving examples where international 
conventions enabled corporations to be held liable.268 
Another reason to not extend the ATS to suits against 
foreign corporations is pursuant to separation of powers. The 
Court urges that the decision to allow suits against foreign 
corporations under the ATS should only be made by an act of 
Congress, not by the judicial branch.269 The opposing view of 
this argument is that the ATS explicitly limits the class of 
plaintiffs to “aliens” while not limiting the class of defendants 
at all, suggesting that Congress did not wish to limit who may 
be sued under the ATS.270 Additionally, the dissent recites 
instances in which the political branches, and not the judiciary 
have “twice urged the Court to reach exactly the opposite 
conclusion of the one embraced by the majority.”271 
While the Court in Jesner went into detail about arguments 
for and against extending ATS liability to foreign corporations, 
it did not take the additional step to adequately assess and 
weigh the harm suffered by individuals, as set forth in this 
framework’s third step. The Court quickly espoused the notion 
that individuals harmed by the tortious conduct of corporations 
can nevertheless bring a suit against the individuals in that 
corporation, so there is no need to sue the corporation under the 
ATS.272 The concern that individuals will stop seeking to hold 
other individuals responsible in favor of seeking the deep 
 
 267. See id. at 1400–01 (discussing the jurisdiction of international 
courts). 
 268. See id. at 1401 (referring to the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism as an example of a convention 
which imposes an obligation on nation-states to hold corporations liable in 
certain circumstances). 
 269. See id. at 1403 (“[A]bsent further action from Congress it would be 
inappropriate for courts to extend ATS liability to foreign corporations.”). 
 270. See id. at 1426 (“[S]ilence as to defendants cannot be presumed to be 
inadvertent.”). 
 271. Id. at 1431 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 272. See id. at 1405 (majority opinion) (“And plaintiffs still can sue the 
individual corporate employees responsible for a violation of international law 
under the ATS.”). 
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pockets of foreign corporations was the extent of the concern the 
Court had with the harm suffered by the plaintiffs.273 However, 
the dissent argued that just because those harmed by the 
conduct of corporations can hold the individuals personally 
liable, that does not immunize the corporation.274 
VI. Concluding Thoughts 
This Note takes a methodical approach going through four 
important, yet controversial, constitutional and statutory 
rights. These rights in and of themselves are not necessarily 
controversial—it is the Court’s ad hoc application of them to 
corporations which make them contentious. As the law stands 
today, for-profit corporations have unfettered political spending 
power, they are protected from legislation which “substantially 
burdens” their exercise of religion, and foreign corporations are 
protected from being defendants in an ATS suit. Artificial 
entities, no matter how small, however, do not have the 
privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth 
Amendment. 
There is no explicit guide for courts to follow when 
determining whether or not a corporation gets the protection of 
certain rights. The unpredictable way in which the Court 
assigns these rights has caused frustration with the parties 
involved in the litigation and the general public. After analyzing 
the arguments of the four major cases in this Note, it is apparent 
that much of the turmoil over these rights stems from the effect 
they have on individuals. In all four instances, the Court’s 
holdings have potentially grave consequences for innocent third 
parties. 
The framework proposed in this Note is an attempt at 
making a more predictable yet thoughtful determination when 
 
 273. See id. (“If the Court were to hold that foreign corporations have 
liability for international-law violations, then plaintiffs may well ignore the 
human perpetrators and concentrate instead on multinational corporate 
entities.”). 
 274. See id. at 1435 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[H]olding only individual 
employees liable does not impose accountability for the institution-wide 
disregard for human rights. Absent a corporate sanction, that harm will 
persist unremedied.”). 
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deciding if a constitutional or legal right applies to a 
corporation. Looking at the purpose of the right in question is 
important to carry out the proper intention of the right. Part II  
analyzes that purpose and determines if it is furthered when 
applied to a corporation. That is important because corporations 
today are not the same corporations in existence at the time the 
right was established. Lastly, considering the potential harm 
individuals may suffer as a result of granting corporations the 
right in question is crucial. While protecting and promoting 
corporations, it cannot rightfully be done at the expense of 
individuals’ rights. This Note is about striking a balance, and 
such balance is accomplished through the framework proposed 
in pursuit of predictability and fairness. 
 
